


NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY

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Abstract: The paper explores Nietzsche's understanding of (Hellenic) tragedy and the tragic. Nietzsche considered tragedy to be the highest achievement of Hellenic culture, through which this people became aware of itself and its ultimate possibilities, but tragedy for him had exceptional value only as the embodiment of a special form of knowledge where the tragic does not have a purely human, but primarily a cosmic dimension. The first conception of Nietzsche's theory of tragedy, marked by the discovery of the opposition of artistic impulses symbolizing dream and drunkenness (Apollonian and Dionysian), arose in the early creative phase and was presented in Schopenhauer's metaphysical vocabulary, unsuitable, it will turn out, to encompass the entire range of iconoclastic premonitions that possessed the young thinker. In the middle and late phase, along with Nietzsche's philosophical independence and the formation of his own language, another conception, anti-metaphysical, with the will to power as a guiding and organizing principle, slowly matured and took shape. There was no longer a division between the force that creates and the force that destroys; the opposite duality of dream and drunkenness was abolished, and the Dionysian was set as the supreme principle of art and life. The previous criticism of Nietzsche's understanding of tragedy and the tragic mainly referred to the first conception, underestimating or neglecting the second. The paper develops the hypothesis that for a correct understanding and fair assessment of Nietzsche's theory of tragedy, it is necessary to approach both conceptions with equal attention, as parts of an integral vision of tragedy and the tragic, and that the second conception in particular requires a new critical reading devoid of non-artistic and non-philosophical motives.

Keywords: Tragedy, Tragic, Friedrich Nietzsche, Apollonian, Dionysian.

Field: Humanities

1. INTRODUCTION

Friedrich Nietzsche dealt with the problems of (Hellenic) tragedy and the tragic for a long time, from his first days as a professor at the University of Basel (1869) to his last creative fever in Turin (1888). He considered tragedy to be the highest achievement of Hellenic culture, through which this people became aware of itself and its ultimate possibilities, but tragedy for him had exceptional value only as the embodiment of a special form of knowledge where the tragic does not have a purely human, but primarily a cosmic dimension, signifying „the primordial tension that crucifies all beings“ (Ђурић, 1997б: 98). He believed that tragedy proved beyond doubt that the Hellenes were neither frivolous optimists nor sentimental pessimists, but that they heroically embraced life as a whole, looking „with a sharp eye (...) into the center of the terrible destructive vortex of so-called world history, as well as into the cruel workings of nature“ (Ниће, 1998: 112).

Nietzsche's first conception of the origin and purpose of tragedy, original and inspired, was presented in Schopenhauer's metaphysical vocabulary, unsuitable, it will turn out, to encompass the entire range of iconoclastic premonitions that possessed the young thinker. We find it in the public lectures „Greek Musical Drama“ and „Socrates and Tragedy“, the unpublished treatise „The Dionysian View of the World“, and the book *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* (1872). In the works of the middle and late creative phase, along with philosophical independence and the formation of his own language, a new conception, anti-metaphysical, conforming to a different type of thinking and speech that had meanwhile taken precedence over that of his youth, slowly matured and took shape. This conception was not presented in a separate article or lecture, but revised views on tragedy and the tragic are present in all later books, from *Human, All Too Human* (1878) to *Ecce Homo* (1888), as well as in the notes from his legacy.

FIRST THEORETICAL CONCEPTION

The basis of Nietzsche's early theory of tragedy is the discovery of the Apollonian-Dionysian opposition, which is the name for two different artistic impulses that prevail in nature and are manifested in works of art. He believed that with the help of these opposing impulses he would be able to understand not only the dynamics and vitality of ancient culture, but also culture in general (Zafranski, 2021: 63). He

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named them after the names of Hellenic gods who symbolize two opposing powers: Apollo is the god of light, harmony and beauty, takes care of form and appearance, determines measure and limit, while Dionysus is the god of darkness, chaos and drunkenness, he provides the strength and depth of feelings, unleashes passions and encourages the desire for destruction. Nietzsche's „Apollo“ and „Dionysus“ are not entirely faithful to the mythical figures of the same name and were already suspected in his time as partially arbitrary constructs, but he did not have any strictly scientific pretensions with them; he simply chose symbols that seemed suitable for his philosophical goals (Jaspers, 2022: 499). Nietzsche presented the agonal tension of the Apollonian and Dionysian through the psychological phenomena of dream and drunkenness. The Apollonian is an impulse that produces visions; its field of action is „the beautiful illusion of dream worlds“ (Нице, 1998: 92), and therefore it found expression in the fine arts and epic poetry. The Dionysian, on the other hand, is a symbol of an ebullient life, of an overabundant creative force, of orgiasticism; its purview is „a reality filled with drunkenness“ (Нице, 1998: 95), and therefore it was primarily manifested in music, dance, and lyrical poetry. The Apollonian addresses the individual and strives for a single perspective; the Dionysian abolishes boundaries and strives for the unity of the whole. When these two impulses came together, mutually stimulating each other, although still opposing each other, the highest form of art emerged, according to Nietzsche – tragedy.

He understood the relationship between the Apollonian and the Dionysian as one of mutual necessity. Although he considered the Dionysian principle to be more fundamental – it is „the eternal and primordial artistic power that animates the whole world in general“ (Нице, 1998: 180) – he believed that Dionysian leadership was possible only if it was in conjunction with the Apollonian. He did not identify the Apollonian with the rational, and the Dionysian with the irrational, since he knew that every art, including the Apollonian, has a certain emotional basis, just as every art, including the Dionysian, respects certain rules and shapes the material it uses. These two principles were directed towards each other from the beginning, and that is why their association in tragedy was possible at all (Ђурић, 1997a: 302). The Apollonian needs the Dionysian as an excessiveness, in order to resist it with its measure and affirm itself as a restraining force, while the Dionysian needs the Apollonian so that it does not dissolve into unbridledness. If this corrective were to be omitted, the separation and absolutization of both principles would occur. The stage itself, i.e., the tragic space as Nietzsche constructs it, is actually a kind of Apollonian braking mechanism, which ensures that the orgiastic song of the chorus does not turn into orgies (Sloterdijk, 1990: 100-101). Nietzsche marked the extreme of the Apollonian with the metaphor of the Socratic, because without the Dionysian it would turn into an „optimistic science“, i.e. into the illusion that thought can not only know being but also „correct it“, while he called the extreme of the Dionysian, „that abominable witch's potion, composed of lust and ferocity“, the barbaric Dionysian (Нице, 1998: 96).

[It should be noted here that Nietzsche believed that his interpretation deepened Aristotle's definition of art as „imitation of nature“, in the sense that art follows the same pattern as nature, i.e., that it is not a reflection of some pre-given objects or an adaptation to some reality that exists independently of the artist, but rather a continuation or even repetition of the original creation of nature (Ђурић, 1997a: 300-301).]

If we consider Nietzsche's concepts of „Apollonian“ and „Dionysian“ in the totality of their theoretical implications indicated so far, we will see that they simultaneously cover the aesthetic, psychological, and metaphysical aspects of the impulses they represent (Haskinson, 2021: 48-49). On the aesthetic level, these concepts refer to any artistic or cultural tendencies and manifestations that arise from these impulses. On the psychological level, these are human creative impulses that constitute the regimes of perception, experience and expression of reality, as well as responses to that reality, in such a way that the Apollonian impulse corresponds to the feeling of being different from our environment, and the Dionysian to the mental state in which we feel connected to the rest of reality. On the metaphysical plane, the Apollonian and the Dionysian denote the conditions of existence that are perceived through the action of simultaneous impulses, or, alternatively, the impulses themselves as universal principles of the eternal cosmos that lead from the human dream to the dream of the primordial being itself, from drunkenness as a human ecstatic state (in which we have the feeling that all barriers are falling, that we step out of ourselves and become one with everything) to drunkenness as a cosmic exuberance, a Bacchanalian rapture that abolishes everything that is individual and finite (Fink, 1981: 31). In the tragic worldview, life and death are intertwined. Nietzsche believed that the downfall of a finite being is not destruction, but a return to the vital foundation from which everything that is individual emerged. Inspired by Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will, he realized that a worldview that assumes the separateness of being, its multiplicity and fragmentation, is actually entangled in an illusion. This illusion is a world that meets us only in the subjective forms of space and time, but the world, if it is (i.e., if it is a „thing in itself“), is not fragmented at all – it is undifferentiated life, a single stream („all is one“).

2. METHODOLOGICAL STEP FORWARD: TRAGEDY AND MUSIC

Nietzsche was the first to examine the problem of the origin of tragedy from the perspective of music. He believed that the historical course of tragedy – the evolution from ecstatic Dionysian festivities to Aeschylus, then the involution from Sophocles to Euripides, and, finally, the inversion into the „new Attic comedy“ – could best be understood by analyzing music, i.e., the chorus, as the basic and oldest structural element of tragedy. According to him, tragedy arose from the Dionysian dithyramb, i.e. from the tragic chorus sung in praise of the god Dionysus, to which the theatrical element of the plot (dialogue), was only later added. By adding this dramatic factor and establishing the „stage“ as the place where tragedy takes place, the chorus did not lose its leading role, but was only „unburdened“ in the world of images (Ђурић, 1997a: 305). Thus, the stage, together with the dramatic action, was originally conceived only as a vision, and the only „reality“ was precisely the chorus, which creates the vision from itself and speaks about it using the entire symbolism of dance, sound, and word. The chorus sees its master and teacher Dionysus in the vision and is therefore always a serving chorus: it sees how this master–god – suffers and how he glorifies himself, and therefore does not act itself. For all its position as a servant in relation to god, the chorus is nevertheless the highest (i.e. Dionysian) expression of nature and therefore, in its ecstasy, it speaks, like nature, prophetic and wise sayings: as a co-sufferer, the chorus is at the same time a sage who proclaims the truth from the heart of the universe (Niče, 1998: 117).

Nietzsche emphasizes that for the understanding of all Hellenic poetry, and not just dramatic poetry, it is of fundamental importance that it was not created for private reading, but for singing in public performance. We are not even aware, he says, how unfair we must be to Pindar, Aeschylus, or Sophocles, since we know them only as book poets, and thus lose sight of their essence, „which is revealed to us only when, in moments of strong imagination, we experience idealized opera, which gives us an intuition of what ancient musical drama was“ (Niče, 1998: 39). The discrepancy between myth and word can easily mislead us into considering Hellenic tragedy shallower and less significant than it was, Nietzsche warns, and therefore into assuming a more superficial effect than it had. What the Hellenic tragedian, as a poet of words, failed to achieve, i.e., the highest spiritualization and ideality of myth, he, as a musical creator, could achieve at any moment (Niče, 1998: 149).

It should be noted that most later interpreters of tragedy did not pay due attention to Nietzsche's decisive reference to the importance of music in tragic art, to its immanent Dionysian capacity. For example, the historian of aesthetics Morpurgo-Tagliabue believes that music, according to Nietzsche, does indeed make sense of the tragic, „but cheerfully, delightfully tragic, almost a kind of frivolously sublime“ (Morpurgo-Taljabue, 1968: 447). And Lukács even claims that music in Hellenic tragedy played only „the role of accompaniment“ (Grić, 1988: 150).

Nietzsche was particularly impressed by the performance character of Hellenic tragedy, its characteristic of theatrical play, in which he saw the most obvious confirmation of its connection with the Dionysian celebrations. Tragedy is not a story, but an action, it is not a reminder of something that once happened, but a real event. It does not talk about gods and heroes; their actions and fates are not described or explained, but the god Dionysus himself acts, or suffers, i.e., acts as the bearer of the dramatic action. Precisely because of this performance character, tragedy does not recognize the division into author, work, and audience, but preserves the unity of artistic factors (Ђурић, 1997a: 307). The entire audience participates in the performance of tragedy; all present are witnesses to an unprecedented event. Since there is no pre-made artwork that could only be presented to an audience, there is no strict boundary between artist and audience. Simply speaking, art is made when people dance and sing together. But Nietzsche did not have in mind theatrical play in the modern sense of the word: neither was the orchestra an isolated space like the modern stage, nor were the people gathered in the amphitheater an ordinary „audience“ as we know it today. Hellenic tragedy knew no such divisions; unity was provided by the chorus. It was not only in the orchestra, but the audience also found itself in the chorus of the orchestra. By inciting an ecstatic mood in the theater, drawing everyone present into the play and song, the chorus transformed the spectators into true witnesses of the events, which is why Nietzsche concludes that in Hellenic tragedy everything is „just one huge, sublime chorus of playful and singing satyrs, or of those who allow themselves to be represented by these satyrs“ (Niče, 1998: 114).

3. GENRE INVERSION: INVOLUTION OF TRAGEDY

The use of the chorus in Hellenic tragedy changed depending on the importance attached to dialogue over time; in fact, on the gradual prevalence of the rationalist-moralist claim to the unconditional „truthfulness“ of imitation. For this developmental tendency of tragedy, the influence of Socrates on

Hellenic playwrights is of key importance. The next step in the decadence of tragedy was the invention of a distracting auxiliary tool—intrigue. The original tragedy was not interested in action but in pathos; everything was prepared, Nietzsche reminds us, „so that the chorus would have more great opportunities for lyrical-pathetic manifestations“ (Niče, 1998: 45). In addition, there was no, as in modern sad play, aimed at maintaining attention until the end of the play, the effect of plot tension and uncertainty of the outcome of the conflict; the themes of Hellenic tragedies were known to the audience in advance, because they originated from myth. [A similar conclusion was reached by the cultural historian Burckhardt, Nietzsche's acquaintance and senior colleague at the University of Basel, comparing ancient tragedy and modern historical drama (Burkhart, 1992: 173, 186).] Nietzsche considered the suffering of Dionysus to be the sole subject of Hellenic tragedy, not only in its original forms, when it was composed exclusively of the chorus, but also in its later developmental modalities (Aeschylus, Sophocles), when a dramatic factor was also added to it. [Nietzsche, of course, did not think that Dionysus himself always appeared directly, but that he was „represented“ by other characters]. The decisive change was brought about by Euripides, who, under the influence of Socrates, favored dialogue over music and who „replaced the powerful dramatic rhythm and enigmatic depth of the old tragedies with logical argument and rhetoric“ (Ђурић, 1997а: 306). Hence, it is understandable why the degradation of tragedy coincides with the suppression and expulsion of the chorus and the ceding of the pedestal to „action“. Nietzsche concludes that tragedy then inevitably began to resemble the new Attic comedy, because the plot is only a „riddle for the spirit“ and an open field for „petty passions“ that are not fundamentally tragic:

„With Euripides, the spectator, a man of everyday life, entered the stage. The mirror in which only great and bold features and qualities were previously reflected became more faithful and therefore more ordinary. (...) The typical image of Helen, the character of Odysseus, was emphasized by Aeschylus into the magnificent, cunning-noble character of Prometheus: under the hands of newer poets, he was reduced to the role of a good-natured and tricky domestic slave and so often stands at the center of the entire drama as an insolent intriguer“ (Niče, 1998: 51).

Euripides' applied rationalist aesthetics („everything must be conscious in order to be beautiful“) was derived from Socrates' dialectics and ethics („everything must be conscious in order to be good“). The art of old tragedy no longer met the needs of the new („enlightened“) audience, because it was unable to provide it with dialectical atmospheres. Authentic tragic feelings retreated when the dialectical competition of heroes began, i.e., when the litigious style from the courtroom was transferred to tragedy. A hero who has to defend his actions with reason and counter-reason is in danger of losing our sympathy because the misfortune that later befalls him only shows that he has miscalculated somewhere, which is more a motive for comedy than for tragedy. Nietzsche does not forget other anti-Dionysian aberrations of Euripides' artistic style, such as the epicism of dramatic verse or the naturalization of the affects of dramatic characters. Having penetrated tragedy with Euripides, he points out, Socratism prevented music from merging with monologue and dialogue and caused musical drama to fail „for lack of music“ (Niče, 1998: 59-60).

Despite the above argument, many later interpreters remained convinced that tragedy had always been concerned with dialectics, overlooking the essential change that occurred with Euripides. Jäger, for example, believed that Aeschylus, in the figure of his Prometheus, „unites the politician and the sophist“ (Jeger, 1991: 135). The treatment of character is directly related to this. Aeschylus' and Sophocles' characters speak more superficially than they act; they only „stammer“ about themselves, as Nietzsche would say. And after Euripides's „anatomy“ of the soul, full of piquant, ticklish details, we should no longer be in doubt about anything: everything is stated and explained. Such a detailed imitation of reality on stage presupposes the idea that reality is a intelligently arranged whole, which therefore has no need to be transcended and disturbed by Dionysian power (Vatimo, 2011: 50). Euripides no longer seeks to infuse character into a type, which has always been a feature of the classical style, as opposed to the romantic one (Niče, 2003: 329), but rather to individualize it as much as possible through endlessly emphasized tinting and shading. However, this nullifies precisely what is Dionysian in tragic art, argues Nietzsche, the comprehension that the eternal life of the will always survives behind the apparent world:

„The metaphysical joy that the tragic evokes is the translation of instinctively unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: the hero, the highest willed phenomenon, is denied to our satisfaction because he is still only a phenomenon, and the eternal life of the will is not touched by his destruction“ (Niče, 1998: 148).

Therefore, if tragic joy belongs to a higher dimension, that's because it is the metaphysical joy of the One who glorifies himself, who is delighted with his own overwhelming fullness and his own perfection, despite suffering (Ar, 2021: 261). From this original and far-reaching insight of Nietzsche, shaped by Schopenhauerian formulas, we see how far ahead of the linguistic tools at his disposal he was in his

early intellectual endeavors. By linking „metaphysical joy“ and „tragic“, he already had in mind a different meaning of the concept of metaphysics from both Schopenhauer and the scholastic philosophy of his time, a meaning that encompasses a wider horizon of experiences in contemplating the tragic. This gap between „words and things“, which would disappear in his mature creative age, was attempted to be exploited by some of Nietzsche's critics, focusing on the „metaphysical“ aspect of his interpretation of tragedy. They regularly looked for weaknesses in the first conception while ignoring the second or dismissing it as the work of a man with impaired mental health.

4. EXAMPLE OF ONE-SIDED CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A good example of such a critical approach is provided by Carl Gustav Jung, who was formed personally and professionally under the considerable influence of Nietzsche's work and destiny. In short, he reproaches Nietzsche for throwing a „deceptive aesthetic veil“ over the problem of the relationship between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In the Dionysian state, Helen did not first become a work of art, Jung refutes Nietzsche, but was „seized from his own barbaric being, stripped of his individuality (...) and became one with the collective unconscious (by sacrificing individual goals)“ (Jung, 2003: 103). Apollonian taming despised this state of rapture that makes man a pure instinctual being, and thus a „fierce struggle“ began between these two impulses. Jung criticizes Nietzsche for attributing to art a mediating and liberating role so that even the ugly becomes beautiful, „the disgusting and even the malicious acquire a lustrous shine in the deceptive splendor of the aesthetically beautiful“. In Nietzsche, artistic nature attributes to its „specific creative possibility a redemptive significance“; he „forgets“ that for the Hellenes, Apollo's struggle with Dionysus and their final reconciliation was not an aesthetic but an eminently religious problem. Nietzsche chooses aesthetics over religion, Jung believes, because it protects against „self-involvement“, against compassion and empathy, turning the problem into an „image“ that can be „comfortably“ observed from a distance (Jung, 2003: 104). [Let us add here, in passing, that Jung's understanding of aesthetics is extremely problematic because he considered the structural separation of form and content to be a self-evident operational assumption. He considered form to be a conscious aspect of creativity, uninteresting for psychological analysis, and therefore he contemptuously relegated all formal aspects of art to „aesthetics“ (Storr, 1973: 101-102).]

As can be seen, Jung exploited the inadequacy of early Nietzsche's terminology to inject an aestheticizing and soothing intent into his interpretation. His boasting of intellectual incorruptibility becomes, however, transparent when viewed from the perspective of Nietzsche's subsequent revision of the entire problematic of the tragic. Stepping on his own philosophical path, Nietzsche also found his own philosophical language, and all terminological ambiguity in the interpretation of tragedy disappeared – hence Jung's silence on subsequent elaborations. Nietzsche himself wrote in the preface to the second edition of his book on tragedy that metaphysical discourse was unsuitable for a purely non-metaphysical intellectual endeavor and that he struggled to express unknown and new value judgments with Schopenhauer's and Kant's formulas (Niče, 1998: 86). Jung believes that the instinctual forces, „blocked in civilized man“, are more destructive and dangerous than the instincts of primitive man, who „constantly experiences them in a modest measure“, and that no war in ancient history can be compared in „immeasurable horror“ to the war of civilized peoples. Therefore, it was precisely from a „living sense of fear“ that the Hellenes gradually began to reconcile the Apollonian with the Dionysian. How? „By a metaphysical miraculous act of the Hellenic will“ – Jung quotes and underlines this definition of Nietzsche. He believes that with this insight, despite the fallacy of aesthetic mediation, Nietzsche sensed „the real solution to the problem“.

„Metaphysical' has for us the psychological significance of 'unconscious'. If, therefore, we replace 'metaphysical' in Nietzsche's formula with 'unconscious', then the sought-after key to this problem would be the unconscious 'miraculous act'. The 'miracle' is irrational; therefore, the act is an unconscious irrational event, a creation from within, without the interference of mind and intention that is conscious of the goal; it arises, it becomes a phenomenon of the growth of creative nature, and not from the cleverness of human acumen born of yearning expectation, of belief and hope“ (Jung, 2003: 105).

5. SECOND THEORETICAL CONCEPTION

Since Nietzsche, as he later admitted, in his first book hastily reached for concepts unsuitable to illuminate the phenomenon of the tragic, thereby „darkening and corrupting the Dionysian premonitions“ (Niče, 1998: 86), Jung took advantage of this in order to defend and enthrone his metaphysical „unconscious“ and discredit Nietzsche as an interpreter of tragedy and the tragic. However, Nietzsche

would come to significantly different conclusions about these phenomena in his later writings. [A change in perspective is already noticeable in *Human, All Too Human* (1878).] The fundamental point is that Dionysus now encompasses Apollo. The Dionysian is not a partial, one-sided artistic principle, but the highest and only principle of art and life in general. It is no longer just a symbol of orgiasticism, i.e., of complete disarmament of impulses, as in the first conception, but rather denotes a comprehensive creative impulse of life that contains the Apollonian measure and limit as its essential component (Ђурић, 1997a: 361).

From the perspective of the will to power, which Nietzsche in the meantime adopts as his basic philosophical perspective, there is no division between the force that creates, that determines and shapes, and the force that decomposes, that breaks every form, abolishes every limitation. Hence Jung's neglect of Nietzsche's later insights – it was precisely the eschatological teleology that led Jung to identify the metaphysical and the unconscious on the basis of the polarity of the opposing Apollonian and Dionysian impulses and their alleged reconciliation. But in his mature phase of thought, Nietzsche will overcome the dualism of dream and drunkenness, Apollonian and Dionysian. Drunkenness is not only an equal natural factor but also an all-encompassing natural artistic force. Drunkenness represents a „physiological“ prerequisite for art; without it, „aesthetic creation and contemplation“ cannot exist (Нице, 2020: 83). The essence of drunkenness is „a feeling of surging strength and a feeling of fullness“, in which a person transforms things until they begin to reflect his strength, i.e., until they become „reflections of his perfection“ (Нице, 2020: 84). Drunkenness is not something irrational; it is the ecstasy of all human powers and abilities, physical and spiritual, their increased interaction; in drunkenness, the expression „intelligent sensuality“ comes into play; it allows for „expanding the view to larger quantities and spaces“.

Nietzsche believes that all true art is „the art of apotheosis“, because it arises from „the feeling of abundance“. It is Dionysian; it does not condemn or reject anything; it is not pessimistic; it is a tragic understanding that nothing can be different than it is and that one should not despair because of this, but rather wish for it to always be so (the eternal recurrence). Nietzsche's formula *amor fati* acknowledges the innocence of all occurrences and creates a new sense of „aesthetic justification“ of the world and life in relation to that of *The Birth of Tragedy*.

„Saying Yes to life, even in its cruelest and most alien problems; the will to live, in the sacrifice of its supreme types, rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility – I called this Dionysian; I understood it as a bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to pass over the horrors and sorrows, not in order to purify oneself of some dangerous affect by a fierce discharge, as Aristotle misunderstood, but in order to be above the horrors and sorrows myself, the eternal joy of becoming – that joy which also includes the joy of annihilation...“ (Нице, 2010: 69-70).

Unlike Aristotle, who sees the purpose of tragedy in the catharsis of the individual who, thanks to the feelings evoked by fiction, manages to cope with personal frustrations, fears, and anxieties accumulated in everyday life, Nietzsche sees in tragedy „an anthropomorphic ontology of the human cosmos beyond morality and a rational relationship to reality“ (Проле, 2021: 248). In interpreting tragedy, Nietzsche took the opposite path to Aristotle: the individual experiences catharsis, but not in the sense of moral purification by which passions are transformed into virtues and influence ethical improvement, but in the sense of a Dionysian experience by which the individual, primarily with the help of music, is transformed into a member of the satyr chorus and becomes aware of the profound analogy between the suffering of the tragic hero on stage and the suffering of the god Dionysus. In Nietzsche's late interpretative model, the conceptual confusion from the beginning of his thought journey disappeared, appropriate terms and metaphors were found, and a unique philosophical position – antimetaphysical – crystallized with the will to power as a guiding principle. Nietzsche's late „aesthetics“ is based on the thesis that the feeling of power expresses a judgment about the „beauty“ of things and states, that the enjoyment of tragedy is characteristic of strong times and characters, and that the greatest pain cannot be excluded from the highest state of affirmation of life, which is the „tragic-Dionysian state“ (Нице, 2003: 342).

6. CONCLUSIONS

Nietzsche's theory of tragedy is a complex intellectual creation, built over a long period of time and composed of (at least) two relatively rounded and coherent versions. The previously presented example of Jung's critical analysis of this theory warns us that we must approach it cautiously and fairly. It cannot be viewed partially, i.e., only with regard to the first conception, as has been mostly done so far. Both the first and second conceptions must be taken with equal attention, as parts of an integral vision of Hellenic tragedy and the tragic, and the second conception in particular requires a new critical reading freed from extra-artistic and extra-philosophical considerations. Until we clearly see the change in Nietzsche's

interpretation of the opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian and understand the essence of the will to power, notes Heidegger, it is better not to use this opposition, which through common usage has „already become too empty“ and has become the refuge of „all confused and confusing speaking and writing about art and Nietzsche“ (Hajdeger, 2009: 116).

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