POLAND IN THE CONCEPT OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE: FROM THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT TO THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Abstract

This paper examines Poland's experience with extended deterrence across two pivotal historical junctures: the Solidarity Movement crisis (1980 - 1981) and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict (2022 - present). The analysis applies a comparative historical method supported by primary sources including declassified CIA documents and Politburo transcripts, alongside secondary academic literature and quantitative defense data. Poland's geopolitical position, shaped by centuries of partition, Soviet domination, and the trauma of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact, has produced a security culture defined by acute vulnerability and deep-seated reliance on external guarantors. During the Solidarity crisis, the Carter and Reagan administrations pursued a proactive deterrence strategy through explicit threats of sanctions, material support for the opposition, coordination with NATO allies, and exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. While the strategy successfully prevented direct Soviet military intervention, it failed to prevent the imposition of martial law in December 1981. Nevertheless, Solidarity's underground survival, sustained by continued Western support, ultimately contributed to Poland's democratic transition and the broader collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In the context of the Ukrainian conflict, Poland has evolved from a passive object of geopolitical competition into an assertive security actor, dramatically increasing its defense budget to over 3% of GDP, providing substantial military assistance to Ukraine, deepening U.S. military presence on its territory, and actively pursuing NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. The paper identifies strong strategic continuity in Poland's transatlantic orientation across both periods, while also identifying key limitations: excessive dependence on an external guarantor creates moral hazard, and intensified militarization risks deepening the security dilemma with Russia.