EU AND NATO RESPONSES TO HYBRID THREATS: OPERATIONAL GAPS AND STRATEGIC MISALIGNMENT

Authors

  • Ilija Životić Beopolis University, Serbia Author
  • Darko Obradović Center for Strategic Analysis, Serbia Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35120/sciencej0502191z

Keywords:

hybrid threats, disinformation, EU, NATO, cyber security

Abstract

This paper conducts a conceptual policy analysis of hybrid threats and the responses developed by the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 2016. Hybrid threats are understood as coordinated and synchronized actions that deliberately target systemic vulnerabilities of democratic states and institutions, operating across multiple domains while exploiting the thresholds of detection and attribution (Hybrid CoE, 2024). In this context, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is examined as a central instrument of contemporary hybrid activity, defined as a coordinated pattern of behavior aimed at undermining political processes and democratic values (EEAS, 2025).

The paper addresses two research questions: how the EU and NATO operationalize counter-hybrid efforts, and what structural gaps persist in their approaches. The analysis focuses on key institutional mechanisms, including the EU’s Hybrid Fusion Cell, FIMI analytical framework, and Hybrid Toolbox, as well as NATO’s counter-hybrid support teams and the ABCDE methodology.

The findings indicate that both organizations have made significant progress in developing situational awareness and resilience-building capacities. However, their responses remain unevenly operationalized. While NATO demonstrates a higher degree of operational integration, particularly in intelligence and rapid response, the EU’s approach is primarily regulatory and coordination-driven.

The analysis identifies two persistent challenges. First, the problem of attribution continues to limit the effectiveness of both political and strategic responses, as hybrid operations are designed to obscure responsibility. Second, insufficient coordination between the EU and NATO reduces the overall coherence of the Euro-Atlantic response framework.

The paper argues that the commonly described complementarity between the EU and NATO remains only partially realized in practice. It concludes by proposing the development of a joint EU–NATO attribution protocol and shared analytical standards, particularly in the use of exposure matrices, as necessary steps toward more effective and synchronized responses to hybrid threats.

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References

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Published

2026-05-27

How to Cite

Životić, I., & Obradović, D. (2026). EU AND NATO RESPONSES TO HYBRID THREATS: OPERATIONAL GAPS AND STRATEGIC MISALIGNMENT. SCIENCE International Journal, 5(2), 191-195. https://doi.org/10.35120/sciencej0502191z

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